Tag Archives: John Stuart Mill

The Adversarial System

 

John Stuart Mill in his classic book On Liberty takes pains to point out that he is not saying that there must always be dissenting opinions. He does not say that a truth unanimously adopted does not at that moment stop to be a truth. Mill admits that when a doctrine does achieve near universal acceptance, that makes it more difficult. That is a serious drawback, because the necessity of explaining it to opponents or defending it against their attacks is most beneficial. But the absence of that does not end the matter. He says then teachers or others who are trying to persuade must find a substitute. They must find “some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question present to the learner’s consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion, eager for conversion.”

 

This is precisely the method adopted by the legal system. We call it the adversarial system. Both sides of a dispute are represented by competent advocates who make sure that the judge or trier of fact or law is fully apprised of all arguments in favor of a proposition or against it. That is why judges never want to proceed unless both parties to a dispute are represented by capable advocates. If they do not ensure this, the judge might make a mistake. Of course, even under the adversarial system, judges can make mistakes, but the chances are much less when that system is respected. It is a system that has stood the test of time.

 

Mill uses another example of a contrivance to substitute for full argument by both parties. This is the use of the Socratic method so loved by my insurance law professor. The system was based on a proper understanding of the classics of Greek philosophy brought forth by Plato. I remember reading some of those dialogues in my first year of university. Plato had Socrates often start a discussion by considering a commonly held opinion and then chipping away at it. Socrates referred to himself as an annoying “gadfly.” Annoying yes; but essential to the task of seeking the truth. Mill put it this way,

 

“The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplace of received opinion that he did not understand the subject—that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed; in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to obtain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence.”

 

Mill also mentioned how a similar approach was used by the famous “school disputations of the Middle Ages.” This technique was designed to make sure that a young student of theology understood fully his own position and in consequence the position of his opponent so that he could successfully argue for one and confute the other. Of course, as Mill realised, the Schoolmen had one fatal flaw that Mill would never countenance by his methods, the Schoolmen accepted authority rather than reason. That made them infinitely inferior to the Socratic dialogues.

 

Law courts in the common law system suffer from the same defect. In matters of law Common Law courts accede to the authority of precedent that they are not free to challenge. At least theoretically that is the case. In practice sharp judges can often reach the conclusion they want to reach. While I love the adversarial system of Common law courts, I too am opposed to dogged obeisance to authority and think this is one of the reasons that courts make so many serious mistakes. If an aeronautical engineers used this method no one would want to fly.

 

For all of these reasons Mill emphasizes that it would be eminently foolish to disregard the opportunity to hear contrary opinions when they are offered. It is so difficult to create artificial contrivances to ensure that contrary views are heard, that decision makers should never forgo genuine contrary views. They should be embraced, never constrained. Mill concludes as follows, “If there are any persons who contest a received opinion, or who will do so if the law or opinion will let them, let us thank them for it, open our minds to listen to them, and rejoice that there is someone to do for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions to do with much greater labour ourselves.

 

Free speech is always beneficial to the holder of opinions, whether true or false, provided the commentary is genuine and not frivolous or vexatious or totally absurd. As Mill said, such opinions should be “embraced, not constrained.’’ the contrary opinion and then deal with it.

That is why we need free speech.

The Deep Slumber of Decided Beliefs

 

John Stuart Mill argued in his book On Liberty that Christian faith had been impoverished as a result of not being sufficiently challenged in his country (England in the 19th century) Those beliefs were once firmly and genuinely held in the early days of Christianity. Then Christians had to constantly defend those beliefs from attack. Christians had to know the reasons and justifications for those beliefs. Over centuries of acceptance by rote, the beliefs have died in their minds. They are what Mill called dead beliefs.  Or dull and torpid beliefs. At one time the beliefs were vibrant, now they are mere forms.

Mill claims that because these beliefs are no longer truly held, the Christians have such difficulty in propagating their faith in foreign countries.  It is hard to convince others of a belief that is not obviously believed. If you don’t believe it, why should I? It is like a Chevrolet sales representative trying to sell a Chevrolet when the customer knows the sales representative owns a Toyota. Actions speak louder than words.

Mill describes these faux beliefs this way,

“The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognized sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended  against open gainsayers.  Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.

 

And that is why free speech is so important to learning truth. It’s the contest for truth that is vitally important. This reasoning of course applies to all beliefs, not just religious beliefs.  All languages and belief systems are chock full of observations and directives about how adherents are to conduct themselves. People hear them and believe that they do in fact believe them. They are genuine about their claims. Yet most people only learn the meaning of them when they painfully have to implement them. That makes them real. The pain reminds the “believer” of what he or she should have known and believed.  As Mill said, “there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realised until personal experience has brought it home.”

For beliefs, the best way to bring the belief home is to hear it argued pro and con by people who understand it. As Mill pointed out so wisely, “The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors.  Mill said that a contemporary author has well spoken of “the deep slumber of a decided opinion.”

In the search for truth, slumber is an impressive and pernicious barrier.

Inherited Beliefs

 

John Stuart Mill talks about beliefs that have been “inherited” rather than “adopted.” I think he means something similar to what I said when I said beliefs were more alive and vivid after they have been defended in debate. These are beliefs that are the product of indoctrination.  Mill suggests that when a doctrine is inherited

 

“conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble to dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favour. From this time may usually be dated the decline of the living power of the doctrine.”

 

If you never have to defend a doctrine it dies dormant inside of you. Debate and discussion, not indoctrination, are keys to keeping a belief alive. The worst thing that can happen to a creed is to have it accepted as gospel truth. That is a death sentence!

Mill returned to the fact that early on in the establishment of a creed no teachers have trouble teaching that creed. Learners find it easy to learn.  As Mill wrote,

“We often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth of which they nominally recognize, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed’s existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realised its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it.  But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively—when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the question which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience, until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being.  Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, incrusting it and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.

From Mill’s perspective it is much better to have a creed in its infancy where is remains a lively belief instead of a dying leaf of a belief. Then Mill gives an astonishing list of beliefs which he believes have been inherited for such a long period of time, that they are no longer lively beliefs at all, but rather dead beliefs.

And one of the examples of such dead beliefs might surprise you. I will deal with them in my next post.

Debate adds life

 

Coke used to claim that ‘Coke adds Life.”  I would suggest, based on my reading of John Stuart Mill htat debate adds life. Mill makes another important point in his classic book On Liberty, to illustrate the truth of this position. He points out

“it is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendancy over other creeds.

After that they die.

I will give another example that obviously does not come from Mill. It has often been remarked with interest that the Christian religion is much more vibrant in the United States than all or most other western countries. Why is that?  Some have felt that the reason for this remarkable achievement is the counter intuitive fact that in the United States religion has been kept separate from the state and the state has not been allowed to establish a religion. As a result, the US has robust religious freedom. As a result of this freedom of religion, each sect has to be constantly aware that there are competitive belief systems out there. No creed can take for granted that authority will support it. It must convince adherents to stick with it and must convince others to join if it wants to grow adherents. No sect can rely on official support. That is exactly what religious groups needs—convincing.  Anything less will be a dead creed. As a result each religious group must remain vibrant or it will lose out to competitive religious groups.

It is interesting that religious groups often forget this fact when they lobby governments to support their religious positions. For example, many Christian groups are keenly disappointed when they are not allowed to have public schools adopt and encourage their particular viewpoints. In the United States, reading the Bible in school has been prohibited. The amazing thing is that the United States without an established church has the most vibrant churches.

Establishing a church or a church doctrine has the opposite effect of making it less real and less meaningful, because no one is required to consider alternatives or debate its merits.

In Europe, for example, where churches have become identified with the state, the religions have become less vibrant. The absence of free discussion and debate leads to religious views become encrusted over and ultimately dead. Religious groups should be the ones to resist their own establishment as official religions.

That is why received opinions tend to be dead opinions. We all know that intuitively. We remember best what we have actively worked hard to learn. If someone tells us something it tends to stick.  I remember when I was a law student. I wanted professors to spoon feed me. The last thing I wanted was for the Professor to ask me a question and defend it. That was hard and scary. Being spoon fed ideas and principles was much easier.

Law school was taught on the basis of the case system. In other words we considered actual law cases where judges had made decisions and then we tried to extract principles from those cases that we applied to new situations.

 

I had one Professor in First year Tort law who was a brilliant and engaging lecturer. I loved his class. He summarized each case we had to know to such an extent that we did not even have to read any cases. In fact, he gave us the principle of each case and I dutifully wrote them down. He even told us we did not have to read a single case!  That made it very easy. Then at the end of the school year, to prepare for the exam,  I wrote crib notes reducing each case to one principle. I memorized about a 1,000 case names with a legal principles reduced to one or at most 2 lines. I was amazed at how well I could memorize. In fact I got an A in that class and was extremely pleased with myself as a result. I should not have been so pleased. I had not really learned much.

In my second year of Law School I took a course in insurance law. We had no choice. It was a compulsory course. I would not have selected the course because the Professor had a reputation for using the Socratic method. He asked us questions about actual cases that he assigned for us to read. In fact if we did not read a case he threw us out of the class because we were then not in a position to discuss it, for we knew nothing about it. That was humiliating and we did not want that to happen. So we dutifully read each assigned case.

Then in class the Professor of Insurance law never or rarely lectured us. Instead he asked us questions about the cases. I was constantly in fear for this approach, because I liked to sit with my head down writing notes, not wanting to be asked questions. After all having to answer questions would make me think. I did not want to think. I wanted to be told. This professor did not allow that. We had to read, we had to discuss whether we liked it or not. We had to think!

I was frequently surprised at how the Professor managed to find things in cases, which I had diligently read but failed to notice. He was brilliant. He found nuances to the legal principles that I could never find. He was a fantastic professor as I eventually realized after my fears subsided and I got used to what I had to do.

Eventually I realized I was enjoying the course and learning a lot. I loved the course. The Professor became my favorite Professor. Not only that but I was amazed at how much I learned in that class. I do not remember how well I did in that course. It did not matter for I had learned so much.

I was even more amazed, many years later how much knowledge I had retained from that class, even though I never practiced in the area of insurance law. The knowledge that was hard earned stuck with me for decades. The principles of tort law, which I had learned so well by rote memorization soon disappeared into the ether. I soon forgot them all. I did not really learn them because I had not engaged in the subject. Sitting back and learning by rote is a poor way to learn, even when the professor is very good and engaging. The principles I had memorized were not really meaningful. They were not alive inside me as the principles of insurance law were. As soon as the exam was over I started to forget what I had learned by memorization.

I think it is the same with principles of religion or ethics. The hard won principles which we must defend mean the most. The easy answers are dead and soon forgotten.

Many years later I became a part time teacher of law at the same University. I realized that I did not want to lecture students. I realized they would not really be engaged if I did that. So I became the type of Professor I had hated in Law School. I used as best I could the Socratic method that my Insurance law professor had used. I wanted my students to become engaged and learn something that would stick in their minds. I wanted them to debate and consider alternatives. I did not want to them to memorize even my ideas and my theories. I hope I did that. I drilled them with questions and made them defend their positions.

 

Indoctrination is not the best way to teach and is not the best way to learn. Indoctrination leads to the death of doctrine, as odd as that sounds. I know many parents who think they must do that, and provided it is done from a very young age, can lead to doctrines becoming so unconsciously accepted that they are never challenged and so long as person does not think about them, they might be held on to. But that is not a good way to bring such doctrines to life. That is a good way to create beliefs that are paper thin and blow away in the first gentle breeze of challenge or discussion.

 

Eventually I realized I was enjoying the course and learning a lot. I loved the course. The Professor became my favourite Professor. Not only that but I was amazed at how much I learned in that class. I do not remember how well I did in that course. It did not matter for I had learned so much.

 

I was even more amazed, many years later how much knowledge I had retained from that class, even though I never practiced in the area of insurance law. The knowledge that was hard earned stuck with me for decades. The principles of tort law, which I had learned so well by rote memorization soon disappeared into the ether. I soon forgot them all. I did not really learn them because I had not engaged in the subject. Sitting back and learning by rote is a poor way to learn, even when the professor is very good and engaging. The principles I had memorized were not really meaningful. They were not alive inside me as the principles of insurance law were. As soon as the exam was over I started to forget what I had learned by memorization.

 

I think it is the same with principles of religion or ethics. The hard won principles which we must defend mean the most. The easy answers are dead and soon forgotten.

 

Many years later I became a part time teacher of law at the same University. I realized that I did not want to lecture students. I realized they would not really be engaged if I did that. So I became the type of Professor I had hated in Law School. I used as best I could the Socratic method that my Insurance law professor had used. I wanted my students to become engaged and learn something that would stick in their minds. I wanted them to debate and consider alternatives. I did not want to them to memorize even my ideas and my theories. I hope I did that. I drilled them with questions and made them defend their positions.

 

Indoctrination is not the best way to teach and is not the best way to learn. Indoctrination leads to the death of doctrine, as odd as that sounds. I know many parents who think they must do that, and provided it is done from a very young age, can lead to doctrines becoming so unconsciously accepted that they are never challenged and so long as person does not think about them, they might be held on to. But that is not a good way to bring such doctrines to life. That is a good way to create beliefs that are paper thin and blow away in the first gentle breeze of challenge or discussion.

 

I have looked at truths from both sides now

 

Mill wanted truths to be tested and defended against argument so the truth was lived. In such circumstances the truth is alive and vivid. Then, and only then, truth can avoid being a dead truth.

That is why Mill says, “He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that.”

To me it is like learning how to use a computer. It is not enough to be told how to use it. We have to use it to learn how to use it. Then the truth of how to use a computer becomes real.

So it is with reason.  A person might have been taught the reasons for an opinion, and those reasons might even be good reasons, but that is not good enough. If a person does not know what the reasons in favour of the opposite proposition are he really has no grounds to prefer either opinion. As Mill says,

“if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be to suspend judgment and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments or bring them into real contact with his own mind.”

 

Neither authority nor desire is good grounds for a belief.  The only thing that works is vigorous open debate on both sides of a question with both sides able to argue their case fully and freely. We must experience fully the weight of the belief on the other side. We must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form. Nothing else will do. “He must feel the whole force of difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of the truth which meets and removes that difficulty.” Unless one fully throws oneself into the position of the other we can never truly know what we profess to believe. We must see the arguments on both sides in the strongest light.

As a result of such reasoning, Mill makes a surprising and profound argument. He says, “So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of morals and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments, which the most skillful devil’s advocate can conjure up.”

Mill makes another suggestion.  He says, “mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered; and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken? Or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory, if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory.”

So free discussion is essential to understanding fully the opinion held. Its absence is harmful to the worth of the opinion. It is not enough that we hold true opinions, the process by which we gained those opinions is of critical importance.  Mill put it this way,

The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate.  Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remains only a few phrases retained by rote, or if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning retained, the finer essence being lost.

If you want a vivid belief, and which indoctrinator does not want that, free discussion is an absolute prerequisite. Without it there is but a husk of a belief—again—a paltry thing. That is why absolute free discussion is so vital. Free speech brings life.

Like Joni Mitchell sort of said, “you must look at truth from both sides now.” Otherwise, it’s only truth’s illusions you will recall.

The opinion is true: Freedom not Indoctrination

 

All I have considered so far, is John Stuart Mill’s consideration of the possibility that the statement might be true. How do his comments apply to statements that are true? For example, if you are a Christian and believe in the truth of the gospel can you benefit from heresy? If you are a liberal who believes that the election of Joseph Biden as president in 2020 was not stolen by fraud should you nonetheless accept and consider heretical opinions that the election was fraudulent?

 

Mill  argued that people should be free to challenge true opinions on the grounds that this would maximize the amount of benefit or happiness for society. You might have thought that this would be a difficult claim to establish.

 

Here Mill makes a fascinating point.  Anyone should be free to challenge an opinion even if is true.  This is an extremely important point and I never seriously considered it until I read Mill.

 

Mill asked an important question, how will an opinion be held when its truth is not freely and openly discussed. One would think that would not matter. Right? After all, if we believe it to be true because it is never challenged we will believe what is true.  But Mill asks, how will we believe that true statement?

 

Mill says, “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as dead dogma, not a living truth.” Mill points out that there are people who believe that it is good enough if a person accepts what he is taught as true.  In fact, as we all know, most parents take this position. For example, they teach their children what is right and wrong. They want their children to accept that the things the parents think are wrong are in fact wrong. They want their children to accept that the things the parents think are right are in fact right. That is their goal. This is the goal of indoctrination.

Indoctrination is particularly robust in cases of religion—perhaps because rational argument and debate are so difficult and as a result the views of the children will be, it is believed by the parents, forever weak and subject to undermining by others. And that will not do. Mill strongly disagrees. So do I.

Indoctrinators don’t care if the object of their attention has any knowledge of the grounds of their opinion or not. What counts is the opinion, not the reason for the opinion. It matters not to these parents that the children could not make a tenable defence of the opinion against the most superficial objection. What matters is that the opinion is firmly held no matter what. Naturally people who indoctrinate others “if they can once get their creed taught from authority naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned.”

The problem with this approach according to Mill is that such an opinion can never be rejected wisely, but actually can be rejected rashly and ignorantly. That is because one can never shut out discussion completely no matter how hard one tries. When rational discussion creeps in, as it always eventually does,

beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility, assuming the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

 This is what faith is. Faith is not based on grounds or reasons. In fact, often it is held against grounds or reasons.  Mill says, it is held like a prejudice.  That is because it is not based on reason and evidence but something else—like a superstition. It is not enough to be told the grounds or reasons either. That is still indoctrination. It is not lived; it is not experienced. It is a dead truth. And how much is that worth?

 

We all need Heretics

 

If heretics feel reticent to discuss the consequences of their dissent there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions and we miss out on the possibility that something of value might arise from such discussion. We are then the poorer for that. It is our loss. As John Stuart Mill said,

“But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy.  Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? … No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead.  Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think.”

 

We need our rebels, mavericks, and dissenters. We don’t need more people that just agree with us.

Yet Mill acknowledges, “Not that it is solely or chiefly to form great thinkers that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of.” This is extremely important! Freedom of discussion and thought is crucial for ordinary people, not just great intellects. People like me. People like you. We must be free from constraint—social or legal—to think freely in order for each of us to be the best that we can be. If we allow ourselves to be cowed, we will not be the best we can be. Our “mental development will be cramped.”  For years, I kept my religious views to myself or to a small circle of compatible thinkers. This was a huge mistake! I allowed my mental development to be cramped! I am now horrified of what I have done. I will never be a great thinker, but until I free myself to speak and think and debate freely I will not be the best thinker I can be.

 

Each of us must break the yoke of authority, even authority with “mere” social power, for that is often the most pernicious power. We have to break out so that we can become the best it is possible for us to be. If we don’t do this, we choose to accept a second-rate self—a poor and paltry thing. And, of course, as Mill argues, all of us will lose out. We all need the heretics!

 

Social Intolerance

 

Even though we no longer put radicals to death for their opinions, John Stuart Mill argues, we must take a lesson to heart. Currently, “our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion,” and that is just as bad.  In other words our censoring pressure is just more subtle. That is not good enough. We still must avoid, at all costs, censoring those opinions. We must allow them to be discussed freely, because they might be right, and we will never know if they are right or wrong unless we permitted them to be fully and freely debated by one and all.

 

It is often comfortable for us to bar fractious debate by “soft” means that do not include fines or imprisonment as was formerly done for we can feel at peace. This is often a convenient way to have peace in the intellectual world, but, as Mill says,

“But the price to be paid for this sort of intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind.  A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot sent forth the open, fearless, characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world.”

 

This is a particular problem in the modern world. For example, I have heard some intellectuals feel constrained to keep their opinions to themselves for fear of reprisals from those in authority.  Sometimes they are referred to as “the woke” authorities. Conservatives in universities sometimes claim they are not allowed to speak freely by such pressures by those leftists in authority.  To the extent this is true those liberal intellectuals must be compelled to change their suppression of free thought. Suppression of free thought causes us all to suffer for we lose the benefit of hearing dissenting opinions.

 

That is why we must do everything, as Mill said, to ensure that “the open, fearless, characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world” are entirely free to engage with their discussion at all times in a fearless way without any social pacification! We need that. That is for our benefit; not just theirs! We must never abandon or constrain anything that might enlarge the minds of others so that they feel free to engage in the most daring of speculations on the highest subjects.

The Assumption of Infallibility

In support of his claim that censorship required the censor to assume he or she is infallible. John Stuart Mill cites historical examples of the monstrous effects of the assumption of infallibility by censors. His first is Socrates. He is now recognized as the most exalted of all teachers of ethics, but in his day, he was executed for his opinions.  How wrong could the people of Athens be?

The second example Mill offers is Jesus Christ,

“The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation such an impression of his moral grandeur that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? A blasphemer?  Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, as treated him as that prodigy of impiety which they themselves are now held to be for their treatment of him.”

 

Even the wisest and most virtuous of men falls into such errors. If they do it, how much more modest should we be about our claims to infallibility? Mill gave one more example—Marcus Aurelius who had more valid grounds to think himself the best and most enlightened of men and had a well-earned reputation of being the most just of leaders, got it wrong too.  As Mill said,

“This man, a better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word than almost any of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and not evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated…the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty, authorized the persecution of Christianity.”

If great men  are not recognized for what they were by censors,  as Mill argues, the rest of ought to be governed by the most extreme modesty and recognize that we could not possibly be infallible.

In the light of such monstrous mistakes, we should be forever modest of our abilities to approach infallibility! Even when we are so certain that we are willing to put people to death because we believe they are misleading us we get it wrong! All of these mistakes counsel serious humility.

This was what Jonathan Haidt called “moral humility.” There is no good reason to believe we will be good at censorship.

Sacred Truths

Some people believe their “truths’ because they have faith in them. Others rely on hunches. Some rely on the authority of parents, teachers, or experts. None of these according to John Stuart Mill are solid grounds for action. This is what Mill says:

“There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting  and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purpose of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.”

It is for that reason that we don’t believe Putin is right when he says he was justified in invading Ukraine. Or we don’t believe the Ayatollah that Salman Rushdie should be killed? Or that gays are bound for hell because the Bible or the local preacher the says so.

Mill makes it clear that no opinions should be exempt from this process. He points out that there are some who urge that some principles are so certain that we should not be permitted to question them. But Mill disagrees. All opinions and all principles, even fundamental principles should be subject to challenge in this way. Only then can we really be certain. Or at least as close to certain as we can get. This is the result of living in an age that Mill says some call “destitute of faith, but terrified of scepticism in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them—the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society.” Of course, as Mill points out, this just shifts the problem, for it is just as important to have an infallible judge to determine which opinions are noxious or useful as to determine those that are true or false. In either case, the opinion must be allowed to be free to defend itself.

The real problem, Mill says, is not feeling sure of a doctrine, which he calls the assumption of infallibility, but rather the undertaking to decide this question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. This must be denounced no less when it is done to “protect” solemn convictions. All opinions must be free to defend themselves, even the sacred ones that are most important to us.

All truths should be subject to debate and argument. None are exempt. Not even sacred ones. That is what free speech means. All “truths” can be freely challenged.